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12.1 Introduction
In the new era of Open Science, the European Union strongly promotes that all sorts 
of data should be able to roam freely within the academic world (LERU 2018). A free 
flow of data enables researchers to not only check and verify each other’s work—and 
thereby to enhance the quality of their work—but also to set up (international) col­
lab or ations in which multiple institutions and research communities can benefit 
from the same data sets. Moreover, data are a key asset in setting up successful 
research collaborations: not only are they the fuel and catalyst of innovative research, 
but the sharing of data is also a sign of mutual confidence and respect (Buttarelli 
2016). Sharing of data can thereby play a crucial role in scientific advancements.
In light of the rise of Chinese universities, and under influence of the more 
prominent international positioning of China under the New Silk Road Initiative, 
Sino–European collaborations in higher education and research are high on the 
agenda of universities on both ends of the New Silk Road. In all such collaborations, 
sharing of data will be important.
Yet, the sharing of data might also come with risks, especially when the col lab or­
at ing universities are rooted in different academic and legal backgrounds. Such risks 
may be strategic, for example when it comes to sharing military research data. Risks 
can also relate to the protection of fundamental rights, such as might be the case 
when data relate to people’s private lives. In this contribution, we focus on the latter. 
In education collaborations, such data may be information about students and staff 
participating in exchange programs. In research collaborations, such information 
will mostly relate to researchers and participants to research projects. From the 
 perspective of the European data protection rules, we investigate to what extent per­
sonal data can be shared with China. Although the European conditions for sharing 
of personal data are strict and might pose serious roadblocks on the New Silk Road, 
we also explore some practical solutions for navigating around such obstacles. This 
approach is based on the premise that the answer to the question of how much col­
lab or ation is possible should be based on a clear strategy, which balances the risks, 
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challenges, and benefits that are involved (d’Hooghe et al. 2018).1 In order to do so, 
we begin with providing a general introduction into the European legislation with 
regard to the protection of personal data and its implications for international col­
lab or ation. Our focus then shifts to the regime for the protection of such data in 
China, after which we identify some difficulties one might come across when trans­
porting personal data on the New Silk Road. We do not carry out a full­fledged, 
detailed, comparative research, because our initial findings already give a clear 
direction towards the challenges that have to be overcome. Given these challenges, 
we subsequently try to provide some directions for navigating on the New Silk 
Road. Some of the challenges are fundamental and therefore require fundamental 
legal solutions. Others could probably be dealt with by turning to more technological 
solutions that can be relied upon to facilitate collaborations, while complying with 
data protection standards.
12.2 The Protection of Personal Data in the  
European Union
Personal data is any information that is or can be related to an identified or identi­
fiable living person (Art. 4(1) General Data Protection Regulation, hereinafter: 
GDPR).2 In other words: all information that can be used to identify a person is 
considered personal data. In the European Union, the protection of such data is a 
fundamental right, which is enshrined in inter alia the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Art. 8(1)); the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (Art. 16(1)); and the European Convention of Human Rights (Art. 8).3 This 
protection does not mean that personal data may not processed, but it does entail 
that such processing has to take place according to the processing principles that 
are laid down in the GDPR, which has been in force since May 2018. The main aim 
of the GDPR is to ensure a consistent and high­level protection of natural persons 
while facilitating a free flow of personal data (Recital 10 GDPR). In order to do so, 
the regulation lays down rules for the processing of personal data, and provides 
individuals whose data are being processed with legally enforceable rights. On top 
of that, Member State’s data protection authorities have to oversee compliance 
1 See further on this topic: Economist 2019. See in this light also the recent China strategy of the Dutch 
government, stating that the Dutch government aims to continue Sino–Dutch collaboration in higher 
education and research, and trusts that the parties involved will find a balance between the opportunities 
and risks—especially with regard to unwarranted transfer of amongst others data and while guaranteeing 
academic freedom (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019, p. 87).
2 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data.
3 Here, the right to the protection of personal data is considered to be an aspect of the right to private 
and family life. See further on the role of this article in the protection of personal data: Council of 
Europe 2019, p. 35.
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with the GDPR’s regime.4 As a regulation, the GDPR is directly applicable in all 
EU Member States.5
The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data. Processing is defined in 
Art. 4(2) GDPR as “any operation or set of operations which is performed on per­
sonal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.” 
The concepts of personal data, as well as that of processing, are defined broadly, 
which provides the GDPR with a broad scope of application. Recital 159 GDPR 
explicitly states that the regulation also applies to the processing of personal data for 
scientific research purposes.6 As a result, in cases where research entails the use of 
data that can be either directly or indirectly related to individuals, such practices are 
regulated by the GDPR (see also Chassang 2017).
The controller is responsible for compliance with the GDPR (Art. 5(2)). The con­
troller is the party that determines the purposes and the means of the personal data 
processing (Art. 4(7) GDPR). Although researchers are generally free to determine 
the aims of their research, they usually do so within the limits set by their appoint­
ment at a university or another research institute. As a result, the university or 
research institute will generally qualify as the controller. This conclusion is in line 
with a 2010­opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party that preference 
should be given to consider a company as controller, rather than a specific person 
within that company. This is to provide data subjects with a stable and reliable entity 
for the enforcement of their rights (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2010). 
The GDPR applies if the university is established within the EU, or in case the pro­
cessing activities relate to the monitoring of people’s behavior within the EU (Art. 3 
GDPR). A further specification of the latter ground for applicability is provided in 
the European Data Protection Board’s Guidelines on the Territorial Scope of the 
GDPR (2018, pp. 19–20).
In conclusion, almost all sorts of processing of information that can be related 
to an individual, by a university established within the EU or with regard to the 
monitoring of the behavior of people within the EU, are covered by the GDPR. 
When processing such data, the GDPR provisions need to be taken into account: 
not only is the protection of personal data a fundamental right, which therefore 
requires careful consideration, but the GDPR also applies a strict sanctioning regime 
for breaches of its provisions. For example, according to Art. 83 GDPR—depending 
on the circumstances of a case—the transfer of personal data to China (or to any 
4 See for a more extensive description of the supervisory authority’s tasks Art. 57 GDPR.
5 Art. 288 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, on some points the EU leaves 
room for further implementation on a Member State level. See for example Art. 89 GDPR, with references 
to national law.
6 Recital 159 furthermore provides that such processing should also be interpreted in a broad manner. 
It includes for example technological development and demonstration, fundamental research, applied 
research and privately funded research.
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other third country) in breach of the GDPR may result in a fine of €20,000,000. In 
the following section, we further delve into the GDPR’s provisions for such transfers 
of personal data.
12.3 Transferring Personal Data to a Third Country 
Under the GDPR
As a form of processing, the transfer of personal data to a country that is not a 
Member State of the European Union—such as China—should be done in accord­
ance with the GDPR’s data processing principles.7 On top of that, a third country 
transfer has to comply with specific safeguards.
12.3.1 General Principles for the Processing of  
Personal Data
The processing of personal data has to take place in line with the six data processing 
principles that are laid down in Art. 5(1) GDPR. In the following section, we briefly 
introduce these principles.8
Under Art. 5(1)(a) GDPR, personal data firstly have to be processed in a lawful, 
fair, and transparent way.9 Grounds for lawful processing are laid down in Art. 6 
GDPR. If personal data are processed for administrative or HR purposes, for 
ex ample for the registration of students or researchers, this processing is likely to 
take place on contractual basis and can therefore in principle be considered to be 
lawful.10 The same applies to processing of data relating to research subjects if this 
takes place on the basis of their freely given consent.11 Moreover, such processing is 
also lawful if this is necessary for either the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest, or for legitimate interests pursued by the controller, as long as these 
interests are not overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject (Art. 6(1)(e) and (f) GDPR). Such interests might for example 
be relevant in cases of medical research, but still require a careful balancing act to 
be made.12
Furthermore, personal data have to be collected for specified, explicit, and le git­
im ate purposes and may not be processed further than what is necessary for 
7 See also Case C­362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, para 45.
8 See for a more extensive discussion of these principles, also Van Deursen and Kummeling 2019.
9 The principles of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency.   10 See Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR.
11 Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR and Recitals 42–43 GDPR. See for potential complications in acquiring consent: 
Timmerman, 2016. There is a special regime for consent in medical cases under Regulation (EU) No 
536/2014. See also Recital 161 GDPR. See for a further discussion of consent in medical research: 
Rumboldt and Pierscionek 2017, p. 2.
12 See on this topic further Van Deursen and Kummeling 2019, pp. 917–920; Chassang 2017.
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achieving such purposes.13 However, further processing for research purposes is 
possible, if—in accordance with Art. 89 GDPR—additional safeguards are in place 
to protect the data subject’s rights and freedoms.14
Thirdly, according to the principle of data minimization, personal data shall be 
adequate, relevant, and limited in relation to the purposes of their processing.15 The 
principle of accuracy, fourthly, entails that personal data have to be accurate and 
kept up to date if necessary.16 Moreover, under the principle of storage limitation, 
personal data must be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects 
for no longer than what is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are 
processed.17 Here again, data may be kept for longer periods for research purposes, 
provided that safeguards are taken in order to protect the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects in accordance with Art. 89(1) GDPR. Finally, adequate security meas­
ures must be taken in order to protect the data.18
The GDPR applies a stricter regime for special categories of personal data. Under 
this regime, the processing of such data is in principle prohibited, except if one of the 
explicit exceptions mentioned in the GDPR applies. Special categories of personal 
data are not uncommon in scientific research. They are all sorts of data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade 
union membership, genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identi­
fying a natural person, data concerning health, or data concerning a natural person’s 
sex life or sexual orientation.19 Under Art. 9(2)(j) GDPR, the prohibition to the pro­
cessing of special categories of personal data is lifted in case the data are processed 
for research purposes and if safeguards are taken to protect the data subject’s funda­
mental rights and interests.20 Moreover, processing of special categories of personal 
data is also possible if the data subject has explicitly given his or her consent.21
12.3.2 Specfic Requirements for Third Country  
Data Transfers
The transfer of personal data to a country which is not an EU Member State is only 
allowed if such transfer does not undermine the European level of protection of the 
data. Under the regime laid down in Art. 44 and further, the GDPR provides three 
possible grounds for making sure that the GDPR’s level of protection is upheld in 
case of a third country transfer (see further European Commission  2017). The 
GDPR’s conditions for such transfers also have to be guaranteed in case of an onward 
transfer of personal data from that third country to another third country.22
13 Purpose limitation, as laid down in Art. 5(1)(b) GDPR. See also: Kaye 2012, pp. 421–422. See for the 
relevance of pseudonymization therein: Mourby et al. 2018.
14 Art. 5(1)(b) GDPR. 15 Art. 5(1)(c) GDPR. 16 Art. 5(1)(d) GDPR.
17 Art. 5(1)(e) GDPR. 18 Art. 5(1)(f) GDPR. 19 Art. 9 GDPR.
20 See also Art. 89(1) GDPR. 21 Art. 9(2)(a) GDPR.
22 Art. 44 GDPR.
226 Stijn van Deursen and Henk Kummeling
A transfer of personal data is most convenient if an adequacy decision is granted. 
In such a decision, the European Commission confirms that the data protection 
regime of the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection. It 
follows explicitly from case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that a 
level of protection that is identical  to that of the EU is not required. Rather, the third 
country must ensure that its laws and standards offer a level of protection of funda­
mental rights and freedoms that is  essentially equivalent  to the level of protection 
offered within the EU, while also taking into account the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.23 Other factors to be taken into account when assessing a third 
country’s level of protection are, among others, whether the country in question 
respects—in both law and practice—the rule of law, human rights and freedoms, the 
existence of enforceable data subject rights, and restrictions for public authorities 
from accessing the data.24 Moreover, it has to be considered whether there is an 
effectively functioning and independent supervisory authority, that is responsible 
for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection rules, and is entrusted 
with adequate enforcement powers for doing so.25 The required level of independ­
ence of a supervisory authority entails inter alia that the authorities remain free 
from external influence, whether direct or indirect, and shall neither seek nor take 
instructions from anybody, and that they should be provided with sufficient finan­
cial means for human, technical and financial resources, premises and infrastructure 
necessary for the effective performance of its tasks (Stoddart et al.  2016, p. 147; 
Balthasar 2013).26 Finally, the European Commission also has to take account of the 
international, regional, and multilateral commitments of the third country with 
regard to the protection of personal data.27
If no adequacy decision is granted, a transfer is also possible under Art. 46 GDPR, 
allowing for third country transfers that are subject to appropriate safeguards and 
under condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for 
data subjects are available. Such safeguards should also lay down effective legal rem­
edies to make sure that data subjects can obtain effective administrative or judicial 
redress or claim compensation in case the data processing principles are breached.28 
Art. 46(2) and (3) GDPR list the ways in which such appropriate safeguards may be 
provided for. Examples of such safeguards are legally binding and enforceable instru­
ments between public authorities or bodies (Art. 46(2)(a) GDPR), approved codes of 
conduct (Art. 46(2)(e) GDPR) or contractual clauses that are approved by the super­
visory authority (Art. 46(3)(a) GDPR).
23 Case C­362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland Ltd 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, para. 73–74. See also European Commission,  2017, section  3.1 and Recital 104 
GDPR.
24 Art. 45(2)(a) GDPR. 25 Art. 45(2)(b) GDPR.
26 For the requirements with regard to the independence of national supervisory authorities, see Art. 
52 GDPR, which is a codification of case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the 
cases C­518/07 Commission v. Germany ECLI:EU:C:2010:125 (2010); C­614/10 Commission v. Austria 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:631 (2012); C­288/12 Commission v. Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2014:237 (2014).
27 Art. 45(2)(c) GDPR 28 Recital 108 GDPR.
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Finally, if no adequacy decision is granted and if structural additional safeguards 
are also absent, Art. 49 GDPR provides for derogations for specific situations. Under 
this article, transfers of personal data to a third country are possible if one of the 
conditions mentioned in the article applies. With regard to transfers to third coun­
tries for research purposes, this may for example be allowed if the data subject has 
explicitly consented to this transfer, after having been informed of the possible risks 
of such transfers (Art. 49(1)(a) GDPR). If data are transferred for administrative 
 reasons, such transfers might be allowed if that transfer is necessary for the performance 
of a contract between the data subject and the controller (Art. 49(1)(b) GDPR). 
Transfers between collaborating universities might also be permitted if such is neces-
sary for important reasons of public interest as far as such interests are recognized by 
EU or Member State law (Art. 49(1)(d) and Art. 49(4) GDPR). Under the last sec­
tion of Art. 49(1) GDPR, a third country transfer that is not covered by one of the 
foregoing provisions is also allowed if such transfer is necessary for the purposes of 
compelling legitimate interests, provided that the transfer is non­repetitive and is 
surrounded with suitable safeguards, while both the supervisory authority as well 
as the individuals involved are informed about the transfer. For the interpretation of 
the concept of “compelling legitimate interests,” regard should inter alia be had of 
the legitimate expectations of society for an increase of knowledge.29
12.4 Protecting Personal Data in China: a Brief 
Comparative Glance Through the Lens of the GDPR
The European Commission has not granted an adequacy decision for China.30 This 
means that a transfer of personal data can only take place on the basis of the arrange­
ments discussed in the aforementioned Articles 46 or 49 of the GDPR. To determine 
whether such arrangements are viable in the context of Sino–European col lab or­
ations, in this section we provide a brief comparative glance at both the Chinese 
approach towards the protection of personal data in the academic world, as well as at 
the context in which such rules may have to be enforced. Before doing so, it is 
important to acknowledge that the assessment of the level of protection of personal 
data in a third country is a complex task that cannot be done exhaustively within the 
limits of this contribution, especially when the third country’s system is rooted in a 
completely different cultural and legal tradition, such as is the case for China (see 
also De Hert and Papakonstantinou 2015, p. 7; Greenleaf 2017a, p. 3). Furthermore, 
it is important to pay heed to the fact that values that are reflected in legislation are 
not necessarily the same, or similar to, values that form the foundation of European 
29 Recital 113.
30 See for a current overview of adequacy decisions and ongoing talks on this topic with third countries on 
this topic: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law­topic/data­protection/international­dimension­data­protection/ 
adequacy­decisions_en (accessed November 29, 2019).
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legislative instruments (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs  2019, p. 48). Finally, it 
must be stressed that there can be a difference between the law as it is provided in 
the books and the way in which it works out in practice. For the aforementioned 
reasons, we do not aim to provide a complete overview of Chinese law and practice 
with regard to the protection of personal data or to do a fully­fledged comparative 
legal study. Instead, we use the GDPR as a guideline for evaluating some of the main 
characteristics of the Chinese approach towards the protection of personal data and 
the surrounding legal landscape, as far as they are important for personal data trans­
fers for the purposes of academic collaboration.
The Chinese constitution provides a right to privacy of correspondence in 
Article 40.31 It is argued, however, that this article mainly entails a right to dignity 
and therefore not a right to protect the private sphere of the individual (De Hert 
and Papakonstantinou 2015, pp. 16–17; Maisog and Li 2017, p. 60). Moreover, it is 
important to mention that Graham Greenleaf has characterized the Chinese con­
stitution as non­justiciable because Chinese courts are not allowed to nullify legal 
instruments that violate the constitution, nor to enforce its provisions in order to 
serve individual interests (Greenleaf 2014, p. 196. Also De Hert and Papakonstantinou 
2015, p. 16). This raises doubts as to the level of protection that is actually offered by 
the Chinese constitution to individuals and their personal data. Yet, more specific 
Chinese legislation seems to offer more assistance for the protection of personal 
data. First of all, both civil law and criminal law regulate the use of personal data.32 
However, although this legislation requires the protection of personal data, it is not 
clear how and on the basis of which principles such protection should be provided. 
Chinese law, however, sets out clearer guidance for the protection of individuals in 
the online world. Under the 2012 Decision on Strengthening Internet Information 
Protection of the National People’s Congress’ Standing Committee, network service 
providers are obliged to comply with data protection principles such as legality, 
legitimacy, and necessity in case they collect or use citizens’ individual electronic 
information. Moreover, this Decision addresses protection measures to be taken by 
controllers and introduces rights for data subjects. The Cyber Security Law further 
clarifies the fundamental concepts of data protection and introduces data protection 
principles that bear resemblance to those provided by the GDPR. The Cyber Security 
Law is further clarified in both the Guideline for Personal Information Protection 
within Information Systems for Public and Commercial Services and the Personal 
Information Security Specification. These last two measures are technical guidelines 
that are argued to be not legally binding, but would still have persuasive effect on 
31 See for an English translation of the Chinese constitution: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Constitution/2007–11/15/content_1372964.htm.
32 See Art. 253 and 286(1) Criminal Law as well as several provisions of the 1986 General Principles of 
the Civil Law and the subsequent 2009 Tort Liability Law. Art. 253 Criminal Law is further interpreted in 
the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement (http://www.spp.gov.cn/
xwfbh/wsfbt/201705/t20170509_190088.shtml). See for a more detailed discussion: Ning and Wu, 2018, 
section 1.2; Livingston and Greenleaf 2015, pp. 22–24; Graham Greenleaf 2017a, p. 19.
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parties dealing with personal data in an online environment (DLA Piper  2019), 
although it is still argued that also under the Specification, unclarity with regard to 
its interpretation remains (Xiaomeng et al. 2018). The protection of the personal 
data of consumers is regulated further in, amongst others, the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law and the recent E-Commerce Law.
All in all, the description above provides a picture of a still fragmented and sector­
specific, yet increasingly more encompassing data protection regime. This picture is 
confirmed by Chao Ching and Tom Zwart, two experts on Chinese law, who claim 
that the Chinese regime for the protection of personal data is matching the GDPR’s 
requirements to a large extent.33 They argue that—although the right to privacy as 
laid down in the Chinese constitution is not enforceable—the personality rights and 
right to data protection of the Tort Liability Law are. At the same time, they state 
that the Chinese approach towards the protection of personal data still leaves “con­
siderable room for improvement.” In this light, they point to a bill for a Personal 
Information Protection Law that is currently pending before the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress. This bill would provide more rules for the protec­
tion of both storage and usage of personal data and at the same time offer in di vid­
uals rights of access, rectification as well as a right to be forgotten. As part of the 
13th Legislative Plan of the Standing Committee, with Class 1 status, the proposal 
should be enacted during the current five­year legislative plan which runs until 2023 
(Xiaomeng et al. 2018).34
Although the Chinese regime for the protection of personal data is certainly 
advancing, some major challenges for transfers of personal data for academic col lab­
or ation purposes currently still seem to exist in light of the GDPR’s requirements. 
Firstly, under the GDPR, personal data have to be protected from both private and 
governmental actors in all forms of processing. The Chinese approach however, 
seems more focused on the protection of individuals in the online environment, 
thereby raising questions as to how they are protected in the offline world—in which 
most academic activities are still situated. Furthermore, although Chinese legislation 
in the field of the protection of personal data is becoming more coherent as a 
result of the Cybersecurity Law and the Personal Information Security Specification 
(Sacks 2018a; Sacks 2018b), there are still gaps in the framework that might lead to 
unclarity with regard to the protection of personal data. For example, the exact 
interpretation of the relevant concepts remains debated, whereas fundamental rules 
with regard to access rights, data quality requirements, sensitive data, and ongoing 
transfers are absent (Sacks et al. 2017; Sacks 2017b, sec. 2; Greenleaf 2017b, pp. 2–3; 
Xiaomeng et al. 2018). At the same time, it remains unclear to what extent the 
33 They sent their report to the authors of this contribution on September 25, 2018. Chao Jing is a PhD 
student at Utrecht University and specializes in the influence of national security on human rights in 
among others China. Tom Zwart is a professor in cross­cultural law at Utrecht University.
34 For the latest updates, see https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/User:NPCObserver/13thNPCSCLegislativ
ePlan. (accessed November 29, 2019).
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current rules with regard to protecting personal data are also applicable in the public 
sector (Xiaomeng et al. 2018).
This brings us to a second challenge. While the use of personal data is thus restricted 
for some forms of processing in the private sector, the Chinese government is 
entrusted with more and more tools under among others the Counterterrorism and 
Cybersecurity Law for accessing personal data in order to maintain social order and 
safeguard security (Xiaomeng et al. 2018). In this context it is important to also 
mention the so­called Social Credit System that is being developed, in which data—
including personal data—play a crucial role (Chen and Cheung  2017; Economist 
2016). Also, the academic world faces increasing government control, as is exempli­
fied by among others Chinese researchers reporting of cameras in classrooms and 
restrictions on accessing the Internet (d’Hooghe et al. 2018 p. 11).
In such context, for the protection of individuals, it is especially important to be 
able to rely upon an independent supervising authority in order to make sure that the 
existing data protection rights are being enforced in practice. Yet, in China  supervisors 
in this field are often closely related to government departments (Ning and Wu 2018; 
Sacks  2018b; Dong  2018) and can therefore not be considered independent to the 
extent required by the European rules and case law. On top of that, there is no clear 
division with regard to jurisdiction between several government departments that are 
involved in this field. As a result, a great deal of the enforcement of data protection 
rules seems to depend upon individual’s own efforts to start legal proceedings. Chinese 
courts are however often described as unwelcoming and subject to political instruc­
tions, which causes challenges for the protection of the rule of law and individual 
rights, whereas judgments are often not enforced or do not provide consistent in ter­
pret ations of the law (Glenn 2014, p. 351; McCuaig­Johnston and Zhang 2015, p. 29; 
Greenleaf 2017a, p. 18–19; Dong 2018, section VIII). All these elements are crucial 
for the protection of personal data under the GDPR. Similar concerns are also 
expressed by the European Parliament in 2016, pointing at threats to the proper pro­
tection of personal data in China arising from a lack of democratic conditions and for 
the respect of human rights, such as independent courts, legal certainty, and adequate 
means of enforcement (European Parliament 2016).
12.5 Legal Arrangements for Navigating the  
New Silk Road
As no adequacy decision is granted with regard to China, the question remains 
whether entities involved in Sino–European collaborative projects, will be able to 
provide for appropriate safeguards to make sure that the European level of data pro­
tection is upheld when personal data are being transferred to China. Especially so, 
since the European thresholds are high and require inter alia not only means to 
enforce data protection rights and for effective legal remedies, to obtain administra­
tive or judicial redress and to claim compensation, but also an evaluation of the 
 context in which such rights and principles have to be enforced.
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We acknowledge the fact that China is making advancements with regard to the 
protection of personal data, especially in certain (private) sectors. Yet, on the basis of 
the available information it currently seems difficult—if not impossible—to provide 
for ad equate safeguards for bridging the fundamental differences between the 
Chinese and European approaches with regard to the protection of personal data in 
the academic sector. First of all, in China universities now seem to fall outside the 
scope of the Chinese data protection rules. In order to make sure that the required 
adequate safeguards also apply within this sector, the entities involved could agree 
on codes of conduct or contractual clauses (Arts. 46(2)(e) and 46(3)(a) GDPR), 
which have to be approved by the relevant data protection authorities. Subsequently, 
however, even if such arrangements exist, the rights that are contained in them should 
also be eff ect ive ly enforceable and compensation for damages should be available. 
Here, things get even more complicated; currently in China, independent supervisory 
authorities seem to be absent or lacking clear guidance as to their respective powers 
and jurisdiction, whereas judicial protection of individuals is still weak.
Moreover, under the GDPR, personal data should be protected from both private 
and public actors. This can be complicated given China’s focus on security and soci­
etal interests over the protection of individual rights, and in light of the fact that 
higher education institutes are often closely affiliated to, and supervised by, the 
Chinese government (Jiang and Li 2016. See also Chapter 9 by Gao in this volume). 
Moreover, recent developments show how the Chinese government is also strength­
ening its control over scientific data, for example by requiring data to be stored in 
government­sanctioned data centers (Normille 2018; Sharma 2018; see also Chapter 9 
by Gao). All these impediments are closely related to China’s institutional set­up and 
to the functioning of its higher education system, and therefore seem much harder 
to compensate for by inter­institutional arrangements. Hence, they call for more 
comprehensive instruments for ensuring a free, but sufficiently protected, flow of 
personal data.35 Until such solutions have been found, however, pragmatic solutions 
might help to navigate around some obstacles on the New Silk Road.
12.6 Technological Solutions for Navigating the  
New Silk Road
In order to ensure compliance with the GDPR in Sino–European research col lab or­
ation, it is important to either anonymize all personal data involved, or to make sure 
that no data leave the EU. Anonymization, however, may be complicated. Firstly, 
when anonymizing data, it is important to make sure that (re)identification of an 
individual is impossible (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2014). Secondly, 
35 On this topic: EDPS  2019; Greenleaf  2016. See for an example the EU–US Safe harbor decision, 
which among others explicitly provides that the data on EU citizens cannot be subjected to surveillance 
operations. For more information:. https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law­topic/data­protection/inter nation al­
dimension­data­protection/eu­us­data­transfers_en.
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for some research projects it might be crucial that information can be linked to the 
individuals involved as such data would lose their meaning for a researcher if they 
are anonymized. Also, the anonymization of some sorts of information can simply 
be impossible given the character of the data involved, as is the case, for example, for 
genomic data (Beyan et al. 2019, p. 98). At the same time, the rise of all sorts of big 
data analytics applications make it possible to combine various datasets. This leads 
to an increase of both the amount and quality of information, and results in new 
ways for identifying individuals on the basis of data sets. All of this makes anonymi­
zation more complicated (Torra and Navarro­Arribas  2016). However, the use of 
new technologies can also be helpful in setting up research collaborations, for 
ex ample by facilitating data analysis by partner universities, without the data having 
to leave the EU. In the following, we shortly explore some of the most promising of 
these possibilities.36
When deciding on whether to make use of such solutions e.g., for facilitating 
research collaboration, it is important to keep in mind that the protection of per­
sonal data should always be the starting point. The methods described here can be 
helpful in complying with the legal obligations and thereby in making collaborations 
possible, but they should not be used for circumventing or undermining the law. At 
the same time, it is important to stress that these technological approaches form 
rather practical solutions for fundamental problems caused by differences in legal 
systems. As fundamental problems also require fundamental solutions, it remains 
crucial to search for solutions on higher levels, in order to bridge some of the most 
important gaps in the legal pavement of the New Silk Road—for example by con­
cluding agreements as mentioned in the preceding section.37 Finally, the use of the 
technologies described here is considered a form of data processing in itself, which 
therefore has to comply with the GDPR’s personal data processing principles.
The Personal Health Train is developed within the health care sector.38 This sys­
tem enables the analysis of distributed data, while keeping the data in their original 
location. The main concept behind the system is to bring the analysis to the data 
instead of bringing the data to the analysis. To do so, distributed and federated 
analytical tasks visit the data source and execute tasks in a safe environment (Beyan 
et al. 2019, p. 98). The Personal Health Train infrastructure consists of three main 
components: trains, stations, and tracks. The train carries an analytical task that is 
provided by the party wanting to use particular data. This task can be a simple query, 
but also a self­learning algorithm. The analytical task is executed when the train 
arrives at the station where the needed data are stored. When arriving at a station, 
the credentials of the train’s analytical task are checked, after which it can access the 
station and carry out the analysis. Upon leaving the station, the output is checked 
36 We made a selection of these technologies on the basis of discussions with experts from Utrecht 
University’s Research Data Management Services department (see: www.uu.nl/rdm), and various 
researchers involved in international collaborative projects.
37 For more on the requirements of such agreements, see EDPS, 2019; Greenleaf, 2016.
38 For more information, see: https://www.dtls.nl/fair­data/personal­health­train/.
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for, among other things, direct and indirect references to individuals. Hence, this 
process also entails a check to make sure the data that leave the station cannot be 
used to identify an individual, for example by combining various queries. The tracks 
are formed by the (legal) rules that govern the analytical task, the communication 
tool and interfaces. This solution can be helpful when multiple data sources have to 
be analyzed as there is no need for data to be multiplied or transferred, and can 
therefore also be a useful tool for enabling collaborative projects (Beyan et al. 2019; 
for practical examples of research projects implementing Personal Health Train 
approaches Sun et al. 2018; Van Soest et al. 2018).
Bringing the analysis to the data, instead of bringing data to the analysis, is also 
possible by applying open algorithms for data analysis (OPAL). In order to make 
this possible, OPAL uses two tracks: a technology track and a governance track. 
The technology track consists of an open source platform and open algorithms to 
 analyze data sets. By applying a Q&A approach, the data are analyzed and only 
aggregated statistics are made available to users. The governance track at its turn 
aims at making sure that (local) norms are followed and that the outcomes are legal, 
fair, ethical, and transparent.39 OPAL algorithms are still being developed, but 
“[i]f proven successful, [they] could be a powerful tool in unlocking private data for 
social causes” (McKinsey Global Institute 2018, p. 43). Practical examples of OPAL 
algorithms’ potential for research can among others be found in the research of 
Salah et al. (2019).
Although the technologies described here might be helpful in facilitating inter­
nation al research collaboration, it is also important to note that technology should 
not be considered a “silver bullet.” On the one hand, using technologies enables the 
col lab or at ing entities to retain more control over their data than is obtained by 
transferring data altogether, for example, by checking the rules that are executed. 
On the other hand, algorithmic systems, and even “simple” rule­based algorithmic 
systems, can become very complex, especially when multiple systems are interact­
ing. Therefore, one might need e.g., other software to check whether and when an 
ana lysis is applied, and what the state of the system is when such task is executed 
(see on this topic among others Larus et al. 2018). Hence, the technologies that are 
used should allow for checks with regard to what they are doing, and whether they 
are doing what they are intended to, and such checks should in practice also be exe­
cuted. This is in order to make sure that no data leaks occur.
At the same time, for the solutions described here to work in practice, major 
adjustments in the structuring of data sets and surrounding infrastructures are 
required. For research partners to develop a script that works in practice, it is 
im port ant to know how data sets are structured. Currently, researchers in many 
fields of science often use their own approaches to structuring data sets, which 
necessitates them to accurately describe these structures for facilitating analysis. 
39 See for a more extensive description of OPAL: https://www.opalproject.org/. For similar approaches: 
http://www.datashield.ac.uk/.
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This may take a lot of effort and is time consuming (Nature 2017). In order to let 
federated analysis systems operate smoothly, it is important to make sure that data 
sets are interoperable, for example by applying the FAIR data principles. Achieving 
interoperability is a field­wide undertaking, which requires among other things that 
data sets are structured similarly, that sufficient metadata are provided about these 
sets and that controlled vocabularies are applied. Some fields are already doing well 
in this regard, while others are still lagging (far) behind. In general, it can be said 
that the fields that most often work with personal data, such as the social and 
medical sciences frequently still lack controlled vocabularies and metadata schemes. 
This might be the result of the rather multidisciplinary character of these fields of 
science (Niedźwiedzka et al. 2009, p. 55). Other fields of science in which controlled 
vocabularies are more frequently used, such as physics and geosciences, but also sub 
domains of life sciences, such as systems biology and bioinformatics, could serve as 
examples on how to develop more unified vocabularies (Richard et al. 2003; Smith 
and Kumar 2004; Courtot et al. 2011).
Until the required changes have been made, more traditional solutions could be 
applied in order to facilitate collaborations. Researchers can for example be given 
access to facilities at the institute where data are being held, where they are given the 
opportunity to analyze specifically prepared data sets. The data analysis then has to 
take place on the spot, while physical and legal measures are taken in order to make 
sure that the data cannot leave the institute’s premises. In this regard, it is important 
to ensure that the physical and legal measures are not window dressing, but do, in 
practice, safeguard the required level of protection of data. Mere legal measures, 
such as giving researchers a temporary appointment at a European university 
without taking complementary measures might, in this regard, be considered 
insufficient.
12.7 Conclusion: Dead Ends on the New Silk Road?
Academic collaboration on the New Silk Road frequently entails the exchange of 
data between institutes in the EU and in China. When such data can be related to 
individuals, and hence qualify as personal data, the protection of such data is con­
sidered a fundamental right. Such data are therefore strongly protected within the 
European Union. They may only leave the EU if the level of protection offered by the 
EU would not be undermined by that transfer. This is especially important with 
regard to data that are processed for research purposes, as such data may often be 
sensitive in nature.
In this contribution we analyzed the Chinese personal data protection framework, 
in light of the requirements that are set by the European Union. Although we see 
that the framework for the protection of personal data in China is advancing, there 
are still considerable gaps with regard to the protection of such data in academic 
contexts. Such gaps follow, among other things, from a relatively narrow scope of 
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rules for processing (mostly focused on online transactions), the lack of an inde­
pendent supervisory authority, and questions with regard to the protection that is 
offered against government entities, which—at the same time—play an important 
role at Chinese universities. In a context where legal proceedings may not always be 
easily accessible for people wanting to enforce their rights, and where personal data 
are considered an important asset in setting up state surveillance systems, all of this 
leads us to the conclusion that there are some considerable obstacles on the New 
Silk Road.
Legal arrangements can be used to provide a basis for transferring small, non­
sensitive datasets, for example for registration purposes, as long as adequate safe­
guards approved by national supervisory authorities are applicable. For many other 
types of data that are transferred for purposes of academic collaboration, such as 
bigger data sets or more sensitive data, these legal arrangements do, however, not 
seem to be realistic under the current circumstances. All the more so, since such 
safeguards should also make sure that the people involved can enforce their data 
protection rights and that effective legal remedies—including for obtaining effective 
administrative or judicial redress—are available. To enable fruitful collaborations and 
to be able to benefit the innovative results of Sino–European collaborations, clearer 
and more coordinated agreements between the EU and China seem to be necessary.
As long as such agreements are not in place, many types of data should be either 
anonymized, or technological solutions should be applied in order to navigate on 
the New Silk Road while making sure that fundamental rights are protected and 
preventing high fines. In our contribution, we therefore also explored some techno­
logic al solutions for bringing the analysis to the data, instead of the other way 
around. In light of all this, the New Silk Road should maybe not be considered a 
dead­end street, but it is safe to say that not all traffic is allowed.
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